This site runs on the published Quark CLI, and this page records the security work applied to it in October 2026: what was wrong, what changed, and how it was verified. It is the public log for the Wave-1 backport (quark-site PRs #22, #23, #24 against framework releases @usequark/quark-core 2.8.1 / @usequark/quark-create-app 1.27.0).
Three holes, all in scaffold code the site carried while advertising fixed package versions:
Supporting gaps fixed in the same pass: rate-limit buckets keyed on spoofable proxy headers with no opt-out, an in-memory-only limiter, no email-verification gate on any path, no password-reset or verification flows, and a worker push-notification handler nothing could call.
core 2.8.1 / CLI 1.27.0; build green. (Versions only; the scaffold code below is what made them true.)TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS gate plus a Redis-backed fail-closed limiter; email-verification gate on credentials, web OAuth, and both mobile routes; forgot/reset/verify flows with a shared password policy; OAuth audience binding with Apple nonce; SEND_VERIFY_EMAIL worker handler in, dead push handler out; migration.passwordChangedAtapps/web suite 250/250 (including revocation tests against a real database: reset kills live mobile tokens, demotion kills admin authority), config 53/53, jobs 12/12; lint and production build green; required CI green on all three PRs.usequark.dev: health endpoint ok (database, Redis, storage); the new verify-email route answers; a real password-reset email was delivered through the production worker (ZeptoMail) and redeemed.REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFICATION defaults to true and the seed never set emailVerified: audit the user table, then stamp known-good addresses — never blanket-backfill. Registration and seed still don't set it./api/auth/google and /api/auth/apple now return 503 without their client IDs configured. That is the safe default; set the IDs before deploying if social sign-in is used.EMAIL_PROVIDER plus provider credentials on the worker service). Without one, links are issued but undeliverable and sign-in refusals have no self-remedy.TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS defaults to trusting x-forwarded-for, correct behind Railway or any proxy that overwrites it. Set false only when directly reachable.